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COMMENT
Selecting a Corporate Form: Foreign
Direct Investment in Vietnam's Oil and
Gas Industry under the 1995 Land Law
Magali Matarazzi*
I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign investment in Vietnam by U.S. investors has been controver-
sial since the termination of the Vietnam War. Originally, there were politi-
cal considerations. The idea of conducting business with a socialist
government, that was an enemy in the recent past, was antithetical to the
U.S. Congress and population. The trade embargo imposed on Vietnam
was a reflection of this sentiment. In the meantime other nations were
willing to negotiate with the new government because business considera-
tions out-weighed political ideals.2 Vietnam proved to be a wealth of natu-
ral resources, most notably oil and gas reserves. There was also speculation
that Vietnam's economy would grow in the same manner as its regional
neighbors. Political pressure not to conduct business with Vietnam soon
changed to political pressure to allow business with Vietnam. Now the
"J.D. 1999, Northwestern University School of Law.
'Vietnam failed to meet the terms of the agreement ending U.S. involvement in the Viet-
nam War, including accounting for MIAs. 133 CONG. REc. S10727-04 (daily ed. July 28,
1987) (statement of Sen. McCain).
2 In meetings with Ambassadors in Vietnam, U.S. officials asked their Japanese, French,
Belgian, Swedish, British, German and Australian counterparts if they should lift the em-
bargo. The foreign officials responded that if they were to answer in their own interests the
answer would be no. However, if they were to answer in the United States' self-interest the
answer would be yes. 139 CONG. Rnc. S8444-01 (daily ed. July 1, 1993) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
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controversy is whether the Vietnamese legal framework can support a free
market economy and whether Vietnam will ride out the financial crisis of
the region.
Section II of this comment discusses the evolution of Vietnam's mar-
ket economy, the current state of foreign direct investment ("FDI") and the
reasons for investing in Vietnam. Central to this discussion is the oil and
gas industry's role in the successful development of a market economy.
This industry cannot continue to grow without outside financing or FDI.
The history of FDI in Vietnam is directly related to the adoption of Viet-
nam's foreign investment law ("FIL") in 1987. Since its inception the FIL
has been successful in attracting investors, but legal and financial risks have
made investing daunting to all but a select group of investors. The persis-
tence of these investors is based primarily on indicators of Vietnam's po-
tential for growth and profits.
Section III discusses legal considerations affecting business in the oil
and gas industry. The current controversy over the Vietnamese legal sys-
tem is based on the government's practice of intervention and the ambigu-
ous nature of the laws.
Corporations conduct a control versus risk analysis to decide whether
to invest in a market. They evaluate whether relinquishing direct control of
an operation to government actors will increase the risk of doing business in
a foreign market. Two major factors in this analysis are the investment
form and the government incentives available under that form. The laws
associated with an investment form dictate just how much control investors
will have over their operations. The incentives provided under the same
laws are factors that mitigate the risk associated with operating under a par-
ticular form. Government permission to use land is a typical example of
this kind of incentive and the selection of an investment form is often based
upon its receipt. A desirable investment form reduces the financial risk as-
sociated with investing through incentives and leaves management control
with the investor.
Section IV examines the Land Law and its effects on the oil and gas
industry. The focus is on the changes to Vietnam's Land Law. The 1995
amendment to the Law repealed the land use right as an incentive to in-
vestment. This alters control versus risk factors for choosing an investment
vehicle. The Build-Operate-Transfer ("BOT")3 is the least risk prone in-
vestment vehicle for FDI in the oil and gas industry in Vietnam. The BOT
offers the greatest investor control of management and thus a higher success
rate and greater profits for the project over the long term.
3 A Build-Operate-Transfer is a contractual arrangement between the government and a
private investor where the foreign investor builds an industrial project and operates it for a
set term then transfers it to the government at the expiration of the term. Wunker, infra note
58, at 367-8.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Vietnam: Evolving into a Market Economy
After the retreat of France and the United States from South Vietnam, a
united, socialist Vietnam became a Soviet satellite that relied heavily on the
Soviet government for financial support.4 In the planned economy that en-
sued, the state owned most natural resources, planned production of those
resources, and owned most industrial and agricultural enterprises.5 The oil
and gas industry was left idle because the Soviet Union imported only the
products of Vietnam's agrarian economy while exporting machinery and
equipment.6 The height of cooperation between the Vietnamese and Soviet
governments lead to a series of five year agreements starting in 1981 to de-
velop Vietnam's own resources and meet payment schedules for Soviet
aid. The Vietsovpetro, a joint venture in oil exploration and refining from
1981 to 1991, was a result of this initiative and the first effort at developing
Vietnam's oil and gas industry.8
In 1986 Gorbachev's declared his intention to reform the Soviet Un-
ion's government and economy under perestroika. 9 There were no immedi-
ate negative consequences to Vietnam, in fact the two nations agreed to
increase foreign aid.'0 However, in a continuing pattern of retreat, the So-
viet Union's enthusiasm for support dwindled with greater concerns at
home and Vietnamese inability to meet the terms of the aid agreements."
Without the financial and technological support of its benefactor, Vietnam
was unable to expand its economy or its oil and gas industry.
' Throughout most of the 1980s, Vietnam imported almost all of its oil, cotton, fertilizer,
iron and steel requirements from the Soviet Union. RAMESH THAKUR & CARLYLE A.
THAYER, SOVIET RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND VIETNAM 61 (1992). Sixty percent of Viet-
namese trade was with the Soviet Union and the military was regularly deployed to the re-
gion. Id.
5 GARETH PORTER, VIETNAM: POLITICS OF BUREAUCRATIC SOCIALISM 43-45 (1993).
6Id. at 184-85.
7 Id. at 195-96.
8 Michael J. Scown, Investing in Vietnam: Oil and Gas Exploration, E. ASIAN EXEC.
REP., Apr. 15, 1992, at 23 [hereinafter Scown 1992]; see also THAKUR & THAYER, supra
note 4, at 196.
9 THAKUR & THAYER, supra note 4, at 77.
'0 Vietnam and the Soviet Union agreed to the fourth of a series of five-year plans that
doubled Soviet aid to Vietnam and postponed payment of outstanding debt. Id. at 197.
" Id. at 78, 202. See also STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 33 (1983). The Viet-
namese were not solely at fault for the deterioration of Soviet support. In comparison to
Vietnam's prior U.S. benefactors, the Russians appeared stingy with aid. Russians were
called "Americans without dollars" and a joke common at the time has the Vietnamese ask-
ing Moscow for help to which Moscow cables: "Tighten your belts." Vietnam replies:
"Send belts." Id.
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Fearing the collapse of its economy and the discontent of its popula-
tion, the Vietnamese government opened its market to other forms of in-
vestment in 1987. On December 29, 1987 the National Assembly of
Vietnam adopted its foreign investment law ("FIL").' 2 Article 1 of the FIL
states: "[t]he State shall guarantee the ownership of the invested capital and
other rights of the foreign investors, and extend to the latter favorable con-
ditions and easy formalities."' 3 This statement opened the way for private
ownership of property and promised government help in development of
private industries.
These economic changes were not followed by equivalent changes in
government philosophy. The same Article 1 of the FIL reaffirmed Viet-
nam's status as a socialist government in all other respects by stating: "It]he
State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam welcomes and encourages for-
eign organizations and private persons to invest capital and technology in
Vietnam on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of
Vietnam, observance of the laws of Vietnam, equality and mutual bene-
fit.'
4
With Soviet aid no longer available Vietnam needed a new source of
investment capital. Vietnam could either rely on its own resources or try to
entice outside sources of funding. In order to reform independent of other
sources, Vietnam would be required to use its domestic savings to fund
economic growth.'5 However, it was considered "inappropriate to commit
the public treasury to the high degree of commercial risk inherent in con-
verting resources into a commodity."' 6 Vietnam's domestic savings at the
time of transition amounted to two percent of its gross domestic product.
17
Under Soviet influence, foreign aid amounted to nine percent of its gross
domestic product. 8 Not only would Vietnam put all of its GDP at risk but
it would have to make up a deficiency through an outside source. Because
Vietnam did not have a public share-holding system,' 9 capital could not be
generated domestically.
Commercial lending would be the cheapest form of outside financing
because it is senior to any other repayment obligation.20 Vietnam sought fi-
12 Laws on Foreign Investment, Dec. 29, 1987, art. 1, 30 ILM 930, 932 (1991) (amended
June 30, 1990) [hereinafter Law on Foreign Investment].
13 id.
14 id.
15 Vietnam 's Transition to a Market Economy; Growth Prospects, Financing Require-
ments and a Reform Agenda, E. AsIAN ExEc. REP.., Jan. 15, 1994, at 8 [hereinafter Growth
Prospects].
16 Stickley, infra note 46, at 97.
17 Growth Prospects, supra note 15, at 8.
18 Id.
19 William M. Stelwagon, Financing Private Energy Projects in the Third World, 37
CATS. LAW. 45, 63-64 (1996) [hereinafter Stelwagon].
20 Id.
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nancing from non-governmental agencies when western governments failed
to offer aid.2' This failure was due to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and
the U.S.'s embargo on Vietnamese trade. Loans from multinational organi-
zations like the IMF proved unavailable because of-arrears on previous
payments and organizations like the World Bank refused aid because they
were aligned with U.S. restrictions.22
Vietnam was subsequently forced to rely on foreign direct investment.
The most likely models for economic growth in the late 1980s and early
1990s were the other transition economies in the region. Other Asian
countries including Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan,
Hong Kong and South Korea were examples of successful transition
economiesW after colonial and communist powers extricated themselves
from the region. These countries relied on private foreign investors and
technology to access their resources and build their consumer, export and
industrial capabilities. 4 In addition to providing the model for economic
growth, these countries were a source of political pressure on Vietnam to
liberalize its economy. The fast-paced growth of their economies, the rise
in the standard of living and the exuberance of foreign investors indicated
that Vietnam's economic philosophy was ill-equipped to deal with market
globalization.25 Vietnam's planned agrarian economy was strikingly anti-
quated in comparison to the successful market economies surrounding it.
26
In 1986, Vietnam adopted a program entitled "doi moi" or renovation
to bring its economy and industry into the modem era.27 Doi moi was a
process of legal reform and economic planning that sought to create a
"market economy with a socialist direction. '2 8 The socialist influence on
the FIL, a major part of doi moi, focused on restructuring the economy
gradually, with privatization as a future goal not an immediate change.
The first step in the gradual restructuring was developing Vietnam's export
capabilities with the most likely product being its natural resources.
21 Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia instigated the trade and foreign aid boycott which left
no other source of aid except for the Soviet Union. THAKUR & THAYER, supra note 4, at 168.
22 MURRAY HEIBERT, CHASING THE TIGERS: A PORTRAIT OF THE NEW VIETNAM 23
(1996) [hereinafter HEIBERT].
23 Id. at 26.




27 WILLIAM S. TURLEY & MARK SELDEN, REINVENTING VIETNAMESE SOCIALISM: Doi Mol
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1-2 (1993).
21 Id. at 2.
29Id. at2.
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B. The Oil and Gas Industry's Role in the Vietnamese Market Economy
The oil and gas industry is Vietnam's largest source of foreign ex-
change revenue.30 In 1996 alone, oil investment by foreign parties brought
in $1 billion worth of revenues 31 out of the $22 billion that had been ap-
proved for investment in Vietnam since 1988.32 In 1998, it was estimated
that Vietnam had between four and six billion barrels of oil reserves and 3.6
trillion cubic feet of gas reserves.33 Because of the earnings potential of oil
products in Vietnam, the oil and gas industry was one of the first privatized
industries.34 Private investors were attracted to the oil and gas industry be-
cause the basic infrastructure had already been built.35 Corporations from
the United States and other nations were actively exploring for oil in Viet-
nam prior to the embargo imposed in 1975. Mobil was the first to discover
an oil field, but when North Vietnam took control of South Vietnam it was
forced to leave the country before development could begin.36 The Viet-
sovpetro utilized the findings of corporations like Mobil to initiate produc-
tion. The joint venture in turn built plants, used Soviet technology, and
trained domestic personnel. Vietsovpetro in 1993 produced 125,000 to
130,000 barrels a day and provided one-third of Vietnam's hard currency.37
Now that Vietnam has decided to liberalize its economy, the oil and gas in-
dustry appears to be readily transformable into an even greater profit-
making enterprise.
The oil and gas industry is a building block component of an industri-
alized society.38 In its transition from an agrarian economy, Vietnam would
rely on oil and gas to provide needed energy for industrial production and39
urban development. Vietnam's major cities, Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi
are the centers of trade and commerce.40 Ho Chi Minh City is expected to
30 Vietnam Economy, INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE: ASIA & THE PACIFIC, (Po-
litical Risk Services), Jan. 1, 1997, at 3 [hereinafter POLITICAL RISK SERVICES].
31 Id.
32 1s Vietnam Worth It?, Bus. VIETNAM, Aug. 7, 1997 [hereinafter Bus. VIETNAM].
33 Allan Marks, Not Yet, INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE, Apr. 1997, at 2.
3' By 1993, 30% of the approved foreign investment projects in Vietnam were in the oil
and gas sector. Vietnam's Transition to a Market Economy: Reform Priorities-Foreign Di-
rect Investment, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Dec. 15, 1993, at 10.
35 JOHN R. DODSWORTH ET AL., VIETNAM: TRANSITION To A MARKET ECONOMY I (IMF
Occasional Paper 135, Mar. 1996) [hereinafter DODSWORTH].
36 Allanna Sullivan, Barreling Back: Western Oil Giants Return to Countries That Jilted
Them, PITrs. POST-GAz., Mar. 12, 1995, at E2.
37 Agis Salpukas, Mobil Wins Right to Drill for Oil Off Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
1993, at D5.
38 Bill Stormont, Legal Development in Vietnam, University Of British Columbia Faculty
Of Law Papers, Apr. 11, 1995, at 1.
39 See DODSWORTH, supra note 35, at 3.40 HEIBERT, supra note 22, at 131; DODSWORTH, supra note 35, at 16.
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double in size by the year 2000,4 1 making it the largest Vietnamese con-
sumer market in tourism, hotels, restaurants, construction and telecommu-
nications.42 Large urban centers have large energy requirements and
stimulate the need for development in other areas of the economy such as
mining and manufacturing; oil and gas exploration; and power generation.43
Another growing need is in transportation in and around Vietnam's urban
areas. This demand stimulates auto production and road and highway proj-
ects in Vietnam. Currently, only ten percent of Vietnam's 87,000 kilometers
of roads are paved because of a shortage of an oil by-product used in pav-
ing.44 To meet industrial demand, oil and gas production would employ
large portions of the population. Increased employment, in turn, would re-
sult in greater demand for consumer goods as incomes increase. These
phenomena are associated with building an economy on industrial produc-
tion and have proven successful in attracting foreign capital and technology
to developing countries.4 5
C. FDI is Necessary to "Fuel" the Oil and Gas Industry and the Economy
Vietnam will be unable to build its oil and gas industry without foreign
direct investment because it does not have the financial and technological
capital to exploit its own resources. As a result the industry is afflicted by 1)
poor performance of nationalized projects; 2) excessive government inter-
vention; 3) inflation and currency devaluation 4) producer and labor stand-
offs; 5) expanding national debt46 with interest payments reaching $200-
$300 million;47 and 6) the lack of competitiveness of publicly owned com-
panies.48 The Vietnamese Government recognized the importance of devel-
opment in this type of industry in Article 3 of the FIL:
[t]he Vietnamese State encourages foreign organizations or private
persons to invest in the following areas: . . . [h]igh-technology indus-
tries using skilled labour; in-depth investment for exploitation and ex-
41 Marks, supra note 33, at 2.
42 Vietnam's Transition to the Market, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Aug. 15, 1997, at 17;
HEIBERT, supra note 22, at 116-17.
43 Vietnam's Transition to the Market, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Aug. 15, 1997, at 17.
44 Terry Knott, Vietnam Ventures - Building an Oil and Gas Industry, PETROLEUM
REvIEw, May 1995, at 224.
45 Pham van Thuyet, Legal Framework and Private Sector Development in Transitional
Economies: The Case of Vietnam, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 541, 546 (1996)[hereinafter
Thuyet].
46 Dennis C. Stickley, New Forces in International Energy Law: A Discussion of Politi-
cal, Economic, and Environmental Forces within the Current International Energy Market,
I TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 96 (1993).
47 Vietnam's Transition to a Market Economy: Growth Prospects, Financing Require-
ments and a Reform Agenda, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Jan 15. 1994, at 12.
48 Stickley, supra note 46, at 96.
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haustive utilization of potential resources and for raising the output ca-
pacities of the existing economic establishments.49
Because of these conditions it would be fiscally dangerous "to commit
the limited domestic government savings to the high degree of commercial
risk inherent in resource production." 50 In addition there is very little hard-
currency in Vietnam making foreign financing a requirement for all project
development.5' FDI eliminates the risk associated with investing Vietnam's
domestic savings. The most readily available source of financing, in the
quantity needed, is private investment. Private foreign investors, namely
corporations looking for new markets, bring hard currency into the econ-
omy in addition to technology and training. New technology also enhances
cost efficiency, thereby increasing revenues by lower production costs.
Vietnam has been unable to capitalize its natural resources because the pre-
existing industrial developments were located in the south, while the ma-
jority of the country's oil and gas reserves were located in the north5 2
D. History of FDI in Vietnam
A fundamental principle of a market economy is the private ownership
and the free transferability of assets. In contrast, a fundamental principle of
socialist regime is the public ownership and retention of all natural re-
sources. To resolve this conflict of ideals, Vietnam adopted its Foreign In-
vestment Law in 1987. This law legalizes the private ownership of property
in Vietnam by foreign investors. 3 Thus, foreign investors are now able to
enter the Vietnamese market and retain the profits of their enterprise. 4
However, because the FIL is the creation of a doctrinally socialist gov-
ernment, the law stipulates that the government retains the role of active
planner and regulator of the economy and industry through application and
screening procedures and monitoring. 5 In this capacity, the government
dictates acceptable types of investment and the sectors to which they can be
applied 6 Specifically, the FIL of 1987 and its 1990 and 1992 amendments
49 Law on Foreign Investment, art. 3, supra note 12, at 932.
so Id.
51 Doing Business in Vietnam: Best Prospects, Major Projects, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP.,
Nov. 15, 1994, at 6.
52 Marks, supra note 33, at 51-52.
53 Law on Foreign Investment, art. 1, 3, 21,22, supra note 12, at 932, 939.
54 Id.
5 Law on Foreign Investment, art. 36, supra note 12, at 938:
The State ... is vested with the overall authority to solve matters related to the invest-
ment operation of foreign organizations and piivate persons in Vietnam... The State...
shall have the following rights and responsibilities. 1. To assist... in the negotiation...
of.. .contracts; 2. To consider and approve . . .contracts; 3. To decide and grant ..
.preferences; 4. To monitor and supervise.. .contracts and.. .operation[s]; 5. To analyze
the economic activities of the enterprises with foreign invested capital. Id.
6 Id. at 933.
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include provisions for labor regulation, foreign exchange control, account-
ing standards, land use regulations, royalties provisions, environmental
protection, technology transfers, corporate registration, tax provisions, and
arbitration guidelines.57 Accordingly, the adoption of the FIL was the first
step towards legal reform in Vietnam. In comparison to the foreign invest-
ment laws of the other Asian nations, the incentives offered by Vietnam
make the law quite liberal.58
The goal of the law governing FDI is centered around two tenets: (1)
maintaining control of planning and management; and (2) attracting capi-
tal.59 The FIL explicitly states that high-tech industries, labor intensive
production of natural resources, infrastructure building and foreign currency
earning services like tourism are those in which foreign investment are en-
couraged.60 These industries are targeted because they are compatible "with
the social and economic objectives" of the state, and there are "benefits to
be gained by [the] Vietnamese party and the State of Vietnam. ,61 If the in-
dustry attracts technology and know-how, is located in an under-developed
area, or is using the existinA infrastructure, then it meets the planning ob-
jectives of the government. Legal reform is of primary importance to in-
vesting corporations because it mitigates the risk of doing business within a
developing country. Thus, although application of the law may create ad-
ditional uncertainties, the FIL provides a good faith assurance by the Viet-
namese government that it is committed to market liberalization.
Because of these assurances foreign investors reacted positively to
FIL's implementation. When the Vietnamese government initially issued
the FIL many regional actors were willing to enter the market immedi-
ately.63 In 1997, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Japan
were the five leading investors in Vietnam. Financing by these countries
is related to two factors: (1) labor costs are significantly lower in Vietnam,
and (2) stabilization of countries within a region make the region as a whole
more prosperous and secure. 65 These trading partners are likewise attractive
to Vietnam because they do not link trade or foreign aid to human rights
57 Id.
58 Robert L. Wunker, The Laws of Vietnam Affecting Foreign Investment, 28 INT'L LAW
363-383, 363 (1994)[hereinafter Wunker]; DODSWORTH, supra note 35, at 16. The law is
liberal due to the "tax incentives, import privileges, access to economic sectors,.... admissi-
ble ownership forms and unrestricted repatriation of capital and profits" by foreign in-
vestors. Id.
59 Law on Foreign Investment, art. 1, supra note 12 at 932.
60 Id.
61 Decision No. 366-HDBT, art. 2, Nov. 11, 1991 [hereinafter Decision No. 366-HDBT].
62 Id.
63 The surrounding Asian countries saw Vietnam as a viable market to invest their own
domestic savings. DODSWORTH, supra note 35, at 1.
64 MORLEY & NISHIHARA, supra note 24, at 162.65 Id. at 163.
372
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conditions and they do not seek to democratize Vietnam.66 European in-
vestors entered cautiously, thus allowing them to observe the market envi-
ronment and the application of the laws. Their reasons for entering the
Vietnamese market were similar to those of the Asian investors.
U.S. investors on the other hand were unable to explore the possi-
bility of investment in Vietnam because of political complications. Con-
gressional continuation of the U.S. trade embargo hinged on Vietnam's
recalcitrance in investigating the status of U.S. MIAs in the Vietnam War
and the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. 67 U.S. investors watched in-
vestment opportunities go to foreign competitors for seven years. It was
due to pressure from corporate lobbies and the political recommendations
of Senator Kerry of Massachusetts and Senator McCain of Arizona that led
to the gradual easing of the embargo.68 Ultimately, President Clinton lifted
the embargo in February 1994.69
The statistics on FDI show that despite negative reports investment
continues in Vietnam. Between 1988 and 1995 foreign investment in Viet-
nam increased from $366 million to $6 billion.70 The size of investors has
changed substantially as well. In the early stages, small and large investors
attempted to enter the market for short-term profits. Small investors have
since retreated from investing in Vietnam because short-term speculation is
not feasible in a market where projects may be unprofitable for a number of
years. 7' It is widely believed that long-term investment, though initially
unprofitable, will be rewarded by large returns in the future.72 The small
temporary investor has been replaced by large concerns with long-term in-
terests73 in power generation, real estate development, auto production and
the manufacture of consumer goods.
The primary factors that have lead to the retreat of the small investor
include government intervention, a weak legal framework, finan-
cial/management risk and domestic corruption. The government has at-
tempted to restrict investment to those areas where domestic operations
have been unable to meet domestic needs. However, the Vietnamese gov-
661d. at 164.
67 134 CONG. REc. S10962-04 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen. Pell).
68 139 CONG. REc. 58430 (daily ed. July 1, 1993) (statement of Sen. McCain).
69 Edward A. Gargan, Vietnam's Oil-Rich Dreams Go Largely Unfulfilled, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 1995, at 32; see also 141 CONG. REc. S9723-03 (daily ed. July 11, 1995) (statement
of Sen. McCain).
70 1989 - $539 million, 1990 -$596 million, 1991 - $1.3 billion, 1992 - $1.9 billion, 1993
- $2.8 billion, 1994 - $2.6 billion, 1995 - $6 billion. Richard Halloran, Vietnam Drives Off
Foreign Money; Corruption, Shifting Rules Hurt Ventures, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1996, at
A16.
71 Mathilde L. Genovese, Succeeding in Vietnam's Emerging Market Economy, E. ASIAN
ExEc. REP., June 15, 1995, at 10.72 id.
73 Bus. VIETNAM, supra note 32.
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emiment has protected any industry where there is a domestic operation by
disallowing foreign competition -- for example, the retail sale of oil.
Within the industries where foreign investment is allowed, the government
also requires a minimum investment level to attract only those investors that
will bring in the greatest amount of capital to Vietnam. For example, the
required minimum for a production-sharing contract, known as a Business
Cooperation Contract ("BCC"), is $10 million.74 Though minimum capital
requirements allow an investor to conduct business, greater sums are re-
quired to retain incentives, without which conducting business would be too
costly or too difficult. Government intervention results in a corporation
being unable to control the management of its enterprise as it would in a
free market economy.
In addition to reduced management control, corporations' legal rights
are still unclear and the judicial system is untried. Under Vietnam's
planned economy several laws have changed, upsetting the structure on
which a corporation has come to depend. Contradictory interpretations of
the government's laws are the result of: 1) regular amendments; 75 2) laws
that are implemented with a socialist bias though based on Western prem-
ises; and 3) rivalries between ministries. 76 An example of these three ten-
sions is an amendment to the Land Law that retracted a grant of land use
rights and replaced them with leases.77 Vietnam has a very rudimentary
concept of property and contract rights in which title and ownership are of-
ten contradictory. 78 This type of policy change is legal and probably not
contestable in a court of law because the court would defer to government
decisions.
This type of legal risk is compounded by financial risk. The Vietnam-
ese currency in not convertible, 79 so loans to Vietnamese parties are based
on other types of collateral, like land.80 The retraction of the land grants
had the effect of preventing the land from being used as collateral."' With-
out this collateral, financing is not feasible and already established loans are
74 Michael J. Scown, Investing in Vietnam: Oil and Gas Exploration, E. ASIAN EXEC.
REP., Apr. 15, 1997, at 27 [hereinafter Scown 1997].
75 1990 Amendment, 1992 Amendment, 1993 Decree 18-CP, 1997 Decree 12-CP all
amended the original FIL.
76 John Gillespie, Private Commercial Rights in Vietnam: A Comparative Analysis, 30
STAN. J. INT'L L. 325, 335 (1994).
77 Decree No. 85-CP, art. 29 & 33, Dec. 17, 1996.
7' Thomas W. Waelde, International Energy Investment, 17 ENERGY L.J. 191, 197
(1996).79 Doing Business in Vietnam: Best Projects, Major Projects, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Nov.
15, 1994, at 6.
80 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 12, art. 7, at 932. "The Vietnamese Partner to
a joint venture may make its legal capital contribution in: ... d. Right to use of land, water
surface, sea surface." Id.
8' Thuyet, supra note 45, at 570.
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being called. This in turn leads to reliance on the untried area of legal
remedies. Because all land is owned by the state and private ownership of
land is prohibited, loans based on land were made on non-recourse or lim-
ited recourse terms when only the revenues from the project were used to
82
repay the obligation. These types of loans are made traditionally on the
expected revenues of the project and not on the creditworthiness of the bor-
rower.
8 3
Additional symptoms of government planning and intervention are bu-
reaucracy and corruption. License applications and approval of foreign en-
terprises are subject to multiple levels of government agencies with
conflicting powers.84 The process is far from centralized and the oil and gas
industry is particularly afflicted. Local officials are required to approve
such issues as labor terms, land usage and land valuation.8 In this capacity
the local agency has the same veto power over a license application as
would the national government. The Prime Minister has an overriding veto
over all branches of government as well. To allow the approval process to
complete itself can involve costly years of waiting for investors. Local of-
ficials have taken advantage of investor impatience by making approval
contingent on bribes. The head of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Ho Chi Minh City, Fred Burke, commented that "Vietnam grants too much
discretion to low-level officials. When combined with low salaries, that
fosters corruption. 86 Though bribery and corruption exist in most devel-
oping countries, these practices compound the other impediments to con-
ducting business in Vietnam -- particularly for short-term investors.
Despite shortcomings Vietnam is making a concerted effort to retain
FDI by U.S. investors. After the termination of the Vietsovpetro joint ven-
ture in 1991, Vietnamese officials stated that "they could get greater pro-
duction using American technology as well as the technical data developed
earlier" from the discoverer of the field.8 7 In addition to having vital infor-
mation, U.S. corporations can influence Congress on behalf of Vietnam.
The needs of corporations were essential in lifting the embargo and can be
equally influential in garnering most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Viet-
82 Michael Ernst & Naja Ngoc-Nga Pham, Financing Infrastructure in Developing
Economies: Benefits, Risks and Sources, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Mar. 15, 1994, at 9.
83 Jay Facciolo, Book Review, I I B.U. INT'L L.J. 165, 168 (1993).
84 Decision No. 366-HDBT, supra note 61, art. 5 & 6. The oil and Gas industry is a
Group A Project according to Article 4 paragraph 1(a) and paragraph 2(a). Id.
85 Genovese, supra note 71, at 10.
86 Mark Matthews, The Euphoria was Not Realistic: U.S. Business Sours on Vietnam,
WILM. MORNING STAR, June 12, 1997, at IA.
87 Stuart Auerbach, Mobil Eyes Drilling Deal in Vietnam, WASH. PosT, Dec. 18, 1990, at
A13.
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nam.88 MFN status is granted by Congress, but can be withheld under the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment.89 President Clinton has already announced his
intention to grant a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Vietnam. 90
This development has been welcomed by businesses because it allows them
to apply for political risk insurance and it further opens the Vietnamese
market to U.S. goods through MFN status.91
If Vietnam were to receive MFN status then U.S. corporations would
receive indirect federal assistance equivalent to a government subsidy or
loan insurance.92 This type of assistance is already received by Asian and
European competitors in Vietnam93 which has required U.S. investors to
come up with proportionately more capital than their competitors. Invest-
ment by U.S. corporations is also a vote of confidence in Vietnam's eco-
nomic potential. According to the U.S. Charges d'Affaires in Hanoi, U.S.
investment has reached $1.2 billion which is the seventh largest investment
contingency in Vietnam. 94 It is important to note that U.S. investor pres-
ence in Vietnam only began in 1994, whereas other investors have been
there since Vietnam adopted the FIL in 1987.
E. Reasons For Investing in Vietnam
As of 1997, Taiwan had invested $4 billion, and Japan, Singapore,
Hong Kong and South Korea had invested between $2.1 and $2.4 billion in
Vietnam.9 ' Long-term investment is competitive among large investors be-
cause Vietnam has the potential for large profits in the future and the gov-
ernment is progressively reforming its legal system.
FDI in Vietnam is a feasible investment strategy not only for regional
investors but also for U.S. investors that have the capital to endure pro-
longed development periods. If these investors were to wait until the Viet-
namese legal and financial structures reformed then they would find
88 Tran-Trong Ky, A Would-be Tiger: Assessing Vietnam's Prospects for Gaining Most
Favored Nation Status from the United States, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1583, 1624-25
(1997).
89 Where free immigration is not allowed and human rights abuses are common, Congress
is unwilling to give trade preference to a foreign country. 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1994).
90 John M. Broder, Clinton Plans to Lower Another Barrier to Trade with Vietnam, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1997, at A8.
91 Id.
92 Seth Mydans, Tiger Economy has Become a Fading Vision for Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1996, at D1.
93 id.
94 Ngoc Huang, U.S. Investment in Vietnam Still Low, SAIGON TIMES DAILY, June 13,
1997.
95 Halloran, supra note 70, at A 16.
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themselves closed out of a market by the investors that chose to endure the
transition phase of the economy.96
Accordingly U.S. corporations have historically perceived that Viet-
nam has strong investment potential. The country's natural resources at-
tracted investment prior to the institution of the trade embargo when the
legal and financial stability of the country was even more precarious. At
the time just prior to the U.S. embargo being lifted, U.S. corporations, in-
cluding Mobil, were enthusiastic about returning to Vietnam because of its
successes in drilling prior to 1975.97
In addition to corporate perceptions, expert analysis has established
that Vietnam's oil sector has strong potential based on its reserves and its
increasing exports.98 Industrialization and urbanization will ensure a con-
tinuing and expanding market for oil and gas products. Under reform
strategies akin to its neighbors, Vietnam should experience similar eco-
nomic growth. A report issued by the IMF in September 1996 stated that
Vietnam is the country expected to achieve the highest growth in the world
with an industrial output of thirteen percent in the first six months of
1997.99 Unlike the other Asian nations, Vietnam can use its neighbors as
models to create policy and set up mechanisms to mitigate potential prob-
lems that they have already encountered.
In efforts to continue to entice investors, the Vietnamese government
assures investors that it is committed to building a private economy.'0 0 A
recent government resolution stated: "We will continue rearranging state
enterprises and creating favourable conditions for them to renew technol-
ogy, increase productivity, and improve quality, for better competition in
local and overseas markets... The introduction of a share-holding system is
to be experimented and carefully expanded."'0 ' The improvement of state
enterprises will make Vietnamese government enterprises viable joint ven-
ture partners for foreign investors. Vietnam's joining the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, the ASEAN Free Trade Asso-
ciation (AFTA),'0 2 and its demonstrated intent to join the World Trade Or-
ganization, have substantiated verbal commitments to reform.'0 3 These
96 The Vietnamese have a saying, "[t]he buffalo that is too slow to reach the watering
hole must drink from the muddy water." In the case of investment in Vietnam U.S. investors
are the buffalo. JOSEPH P. QUINLAN, VIETNAM: BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS 12
(1995).
97 Agis SalPukas, Mobil Wins Right to Drill for Oil off Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
1993, at D5.
98 Scown 1992, supra note 8, at 24.
99 POLITICAL RISK SERVICES, supra note 30, at 3.
100DoDSWORTH, supra note 35, at 15.
'0o Resolution of the 11th Session of the Ninth Nat'l Assembly, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, June 7, 1997 [hereinafter BBC SUMMARY].
102DODSWORTH, supra note 35, at 2.
103 Mydans, supra note 92, at DI.
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alignments have been hailed as an irreversible "lock" on economic liberali-
zation.
10 4
From a legal perspective legal reform in the creation and application of
the foreign investment laws is a foreseeable event. The National Assembly
in May 1997 recognized that the laws dealing with cooperative ventures,
those most likely to affect oil and gas projects, lacked satisfactory imple-
mentation. 15 The National Assembly's statement reflected a commitment
to correct the situation. The government is also debating the repeal of the
February 1995 decree converting land use rights into leases. 10 6 If one as-
sumes that "reform of any legal system occurs in cautious, incremental
steps," then revision of the law indicates reform in the future. 10 7 To ensure
that this occurs sooner than later, multilateral institutions like the World
Bank have pre-conditioned loan assistance on reform.'0 8 On a firm belief
that Vietnam will reform, the President of the World Bank, James Wolfen-
sohn, committed $1.3 billion to Vietnam in 1997 and $1.5 billion over the
next three years.'0 9 Legal reform is also evidenced by Vietnam's adoption
of a Civil Code in 1996.110
From a business perspective, strategic planning can reduce the prob-
lems associated with a developing legal and economic infrastructure. Ac-
cording to Michael Scown, former president of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Vietnam, for U.S. investors to capitalize now on future prof-
itability they must "set more realistic goals, truly commit to projects and
settle in for the long haul."'' To achieve this end, oil and gas investors
must investigate the legal forms of enterprise that can be used to enter the
market and determine which is suitable to their risk and financial capacity.
In addition, investors must decide whether it is beneficial for them to as-
sume more financial risk in order to reduce management risk. The most
profitable investment vehicle could be one that is initially subject to greater
legal and financial risk, but less management risk because of efficient man-
agement and operations. Efficient management is linked to greater profits.
Recent changes in the Land Law give investors an opportunity to assume
more control now that an incentive attached to a government joint venture
partner has been repealed. It is the author's contention that investors should
104 id.
'
05 BBC SUMMARY, supra note 101.
106 Clifford J. Schultz & William J. Andry IV, Asia's Next Tiger?, MARKETING
MANAGEMENT, Winter 1997,, at 28.
107 Gillespie, supra note 76, at 335.
'08 Ngo Vinh Long, A Letter From Vietnam, CHALLENGE, Jan/Feb. 1997, at 87;
DODSWORTH, supra note 35, at 15.
109 DODSWORTH, supra note 35, at 15.
110 Scown 1997, supra note 74, at 17.
... Shultz & Andrey, supra note 106, at 29.
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operate as 100% foreign-owned entities under a build-operate-transfer con-
tract because of greater management control.
III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING BUSINESS
A. Government Administration
A part of the weakness of Vietnam's legal system has to do with who
within the government has the power to make and implement the laws af-
fecting FDI. The National Assembly decides Vietnam's plan for socio-
economic development including issuing laws like the FIL which privatized
parts of the economy."12 The National Assembly also elects the Prime
Minister who nominates ministers to head the various branches of govern-
ment." 3 Collectively, the ministers are known as the Government, 1 4 and
have the task of being the administrative arm of the National Assembly.' 15
The Government also drafts laws that apply to all areas of society and the
economy. 16 Individual ministries may also draft laws particular to the area
they are administering or they institute decrees that put into effect regula-
tions adopted by the Government. ' 7 The Prime Minister has veto power
over the laws and regulations adopted by the ministries and other local gov-
ernment entities known as the People's Committees." 8 The laws often
stipulate that some or all of national or local government agencies adminis-
ter its terms on behalf of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister.19
This system results in overlapping authority among the national and local
levels of government.
When the National Assembly promulgated the Foreign Investment
Law it created yet another separate entity, the State Committee for Coop-
eration and Investment ("SCCI"), to administer its provisions. The SCCI
reviews applications and grants licenses in accordance with the FIL.120 The
SCCI can also propose new regulations, which if approved by the Prime
112 Vietnam Net: The National Assembly (Mar. 5, 1998)
<http://home.vnn.vn/english/government/assembly.html>.
113 James Finch & Sesto Vecchi, New Amendments, Regulations to Foreign Investment
Law, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Nov. 15, 1993, at 12.
114 id.
115 Vietnam Net: The Government (Mar. 5, 1998) <http://home.vnn.vn/english/
govemment/govemment.html> (visited on May 20, 1999) [hereinafter The Government].
116 Scown 1992, supra note 8, at 9.
171d.
18 The Government, supra note 115.
119 Decree No. 18/CP, art. 21-22, Feb. 13, 1995 [hereinafter Decree No. 18/CP]; Decree
No. 87-CP, art. 18, Nov. 23, 1993; Regulation on Foreign Investment, art. 104-105, Apr. 16,
1993 [hereinafter Regulation on Foreign Investment].120 Finch & Vecchi, supra note 113, at 8.
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Minister would be signed into law on behalf of the Government. 21 The
SCCI and the ministries are supposed to confer on a project before submit-
ting it to the Prime Minister for final approval, however, in case of dis-
agreement, the SCCI sets up an independent Council of ministry officials to
finally evaluate the project. 122
The overlap in government authority is also apparent in the admini-
stration of Vietnam's Land Law. The Land Law, revised as of 1995, stipu-
lates that several branches of government are responsible for setting rental
rates, valuing land and granting land use rights. The Ministry of Finance
issues a "rental frame" of standardized rental rates based on the type of land
to be rented. 123 The People's Committees are then responsible for actually
setting the rental rates based on the rental frame and have the discretion to
readjust the rate by up to fifteen percent after five years. 124 The valuation of
the land use right, in cases where land is granted rather than rented, is de-
termined by the People's Committees based on the same rental frame used
to set rental rates. 25 In the event that the rental rate or the valuation is not
deemed suitable by the Ministry of Finance, the Prime Minister has the
authority to override the rate set by the People's Committees. 2 6 The actual
authority to allocate land, regardless of whether the land is leased or granted
is delegated to the People's Committees, then reviewed by the Government
and finally approved by the National Assembly. 127
This deferral of decisions from a central body to local agencies induces
bureaucratic delay and corruption. For example, the People's Committees
of provinces and cities to make a recommend land rental rates to the SCCI
they are generally over-valued. 2 8 The rent paid on the land is remitted to
the State, a portion of which gets allocated to the local provinces in rental
fees and taxes on the land. This provides an incentive to overvalue the land
for the benefit of local treasuries.
Recent legislation has sought to centralize the decision making process
to this type of government corruption. The 1996 revisions' to the FIL
stipulates that the Prime Minister, rather than the People's Committees, de-
'2 Id. at 12.
122 Genovese, supra note 7 1, at 10.
123 Decree No. 18/CP, supra note 119, art. 3. Land is classified generally by activity to
take place on it. For example, land can be designated for professional activities, industrial
activities, tourist activities, agricultural activities, urban use, suburban use and rural use. De-
cree No. 1417-TCiTCDN, Regulation on the Rent Prices for Land, art. 3, Dec. 28, 1994.
124 Decree No. 18/CP, supra note 119, at art. 3
121Id. at art. 10.
126 The Government, supra note 115.
127 Law on Land, art. 23, July 14, 1993 [hereinafter Law on Land]; Decree No. I8/CP, su-
pra note 119, at art. 4.
128 Decree No. 1 1/CP, art. 5, 8, 16, July 15, 1991.
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termine land rents for projects using fifty hectares of non-urban land' 29 and
for leases that are for fifty to seventy years.130  The Government is at-
tempting to has abolish old systems in favor of new ones that are more
closely attached to the central Government so that the management of for-
eign investment is uniform13 '
The Government is still trying to work out an efficient structure for the
administration of its laws. Recently, the Ministry of Planning and Invest-
ment was created to actively coordinate the activities of the other ministries
and People's Committees. 32 The responsibilities of the SCCI were handed
over to the Ministry of Finance and the SCCI was abolished. Reform is a
welcome development to foreign investors that are often required to work
closely with government entities. However, until the government is able to
reduce bureaucracy and corruption working with a government agency is
often a liability to a foreign investor.
B. Control v. Risk
For a corporation to be able to mitigate risk in FDI it must recognize
that there is a link between the risk in capital investment and control. 3
The greater the capital investment provided by a foreign investor to a proj-
ect, the greater its incentive to control its operations. To prevent financial
loss the party with the greatest management expertise is best equipped to
make the most efficient management decisions. Inexperienced management
threatens the success of the project. A corporation's lack of complete con-
trol over management is considered the aspect of government intervention
that is most likely to contribute to failure. 134 Failure in combination with
non-recourse indebtedness results in excessive risk to a foreign investor's
creditors. Lending institutions are unlikely to provide financing if they fear
mismanagement will lead to a bankrupt operation.
Vietnam's planned economy skews the balancing between risk and
control that normally takes place in a free market economy. Despite its in-
experience in free market enterprise, the government reserves the right to
plan the development of the oil and gas industry because of its importance
to Vietnam's industrialization. 35 However, they do not have the domestic
savings or hard currency to carry the financial burden of development. 136
129 Thanh Nguyen, New Foreign Investment Law Implementing Regulations, 19 E. ASIAN
EXEC. REP. 9, 12 (Mar. 15, 1997).
130 Decree No. 18CP, supra note 119, art. 4. Industrial projects including the oil and gas
industry fall into this category. Id.
131 Law on Foreign Investment, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Mar. 1, 1997, at 27-28.
32 Id. at 28.
133 Waelde, supra note 78, at 200.
134 Stelwagon, supra note 19, at 67.
135 Law on Petroleum, art. 38, July 14, 1993 [hereinafter Law on Petroleum].
136 Stickley, supra note 46, at 97; Growth Prospects, supra note 15, at 8.
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Foreign investors are required to take on a disproportionately greater finan-
cial risk with respect to the control they have over management decisions.
Corporations will try to mitigate financial risk and retain control over
management of the project. Of particular importance to investors is the
type of entity with which they will try to enter the Vietnamese market. At
present, it is possible to enter through a production sharing contract, a joint
venture, as a subsidiary of a foreign corporation or through a build-operate-
transfer contract. The amount of financial risk and degree of managerial
control varies for each investment form. Though the state may possess
ownership of oil extracted and have a contractual right to "overall manage-
ment," management pbwers are still retained by the investor 137 to varying
degrees based on form. Balancing not only affects the type of investment
form a foreign investor would like to choose but also effects the type of
form Vietnam will allow the investor to use.
In this manner the FIL directly influences control v. risk analysis. It
dictates the financial and legal characteristics of each business form138 and
the investment forms the investor can use. In an analysis of FDI in Vietnam
foreign investors maintain that financial risk is mitigated by foreign control
over management. When deciding which form to use, foreign investors' fi-
nancial considerations are the minimum capital requirements and the per-
centage of profits that they will receive based on their initial investment
within a fixed duration. The greater the percentage profits they can retain
and the longer they are allowed to operate the more willing foreign inves-
tors will be to assume a higher minimum capital requirement.
Important legal considerations to a foreign investor are the managerial
characteristics of an investment form. These include the participation of a
domestic entity and the degree of foreign management autonomy. In Viet-
nam's planned economy, a domestic partner to a project is subject to a gov-
ernment advisory committee and is often an agent or subdivision of the
government.' 39 The degree of involvement is particularly high in an indus-
try as vital as the oil and gas industry is to Vietnam's development. The
greater the control foreign investors have over operations the more likely
they will be willing to bear the lack of efficiency associated with conduct-
ing business with a less skilled domestic partner.
C. Investment Vehicles under the FIL
Currently, the FIL allows investment in Vietnam in most industries un-
der a business cooperation contract, a joint venture, a 100% foreign owned
137 Growth Prospects, supra note 15, at 8.
138 Law on Foreign Investment, chapt. II. Nov. 12, 1996 [hereinafter Law on Foreign In-
vestment 1996].
139 Law on Petroleum, supra note 135, art. 14. Petrovietnam is the state corporation cre-
ated to conduct operations in oil and gas and enter into contracts with other organizations in
the oil and gas industry. Id.
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entity and a build-operate-transfer contract. A business cooperation con-
tract ("BCC") is also known as a production-sharing contract. It does not
create a legal entity, only a contractual relationship. 140 Profits, management
and technology transfers are negotiated by the government and explicitly
stated in the contractual agreement. The government approves all contract
terms. 14 1 The foreign participant is funded entirely by foreign capital. 142
The minimum capital requirement is $10 million. The contract allows the
forein concern to share in the revenues, but it does not have equity owner-
ship. R 3 Profit-sharing terms are specified in the contract and are not a pro-
rata percentage of the original investment. The project is designed to per-
form a certain task and end. It is not an ongoing relationship for a specific
time period. The foreign entity has control over its part of the project be-
cause it has negotiated for specific contractual obligations. Because of the
inflexibility and the limited duration of such an agreement this arrangement
is not suitable for the long-term and complex arrangements necessary for
the development of an oil and gas project.
A joint venture creates a legal entity distinct from either partner.' 44
The domestic partner maybe a government entity or a private domestic en-
terprise. For the oil and gas industry the parties are the state agent, Pet-
rovietnam and a foreign investor(s).' 4s The joint venture, unlike the BCC,
creates a new enterprise that has greater productive capacity, technology
and market entry potential than either of the partners on their own. 146 The
foreign partner has to contribute a minimum of thirty percent of the total
capital. 147 Profits are apportioned according to the capital contribution of
the partners for a duration not to exceed seventy years. State approval is
required before production can begin. 148 In addition, a board of manage-
ment runs the partnership, the general manager of which must be Vietnam-
ese. The number of managers per party is pro-rated based on their
respective capital contributions. 49 Boards must reach a unanimous deci-
sion on major issues even though local partners generally hold a minority of
140 Wunker, supra note 58, at 365.
141 Genovese, supra note 71, at 8.
142 Tim Tien-Chun Chang, Doing Business With Vietnam, 40 PRAC. LAw. 33, 35 (1994).
143 Global Private Power, 1995 B. C. & M. R. 5, (The Financial Times), Dec. 1, 1995, at
2 [hereinafter Global Private Power].
144 Chang, supra note 142, at 35.
145 Law on Petroleum, supra note 135, art. 14.
146 Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1526
(1982).
147 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 12, arts. 4 & 6-13.
148 Genovese, supra note 71, at 8.
149 Thuyet, supra note 45, at 576.
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the assets.150 It is likely that the private requirements of the foreign investor
would become secondary to the public policy goals of the state agency.' 5'
A 100% foreign-owned entity ("FOE") is the subsidiary of a foreign
enterprise. The subsidiary is subject to the same laws as a domestic corpo-
ration. The FOE is required to have at least thirty percent of its capital sup-
plied by foreign investors, but allows up to one hundred percent of the
capital to be supplied by a foreign investor. 15 2 This is a very liberal provi-
sion since most governments restrict foreign ownership to forty-nine per-
cent and do not allow the repatriation of profits.15  No government
approval is required15 4 except in certain strategic industries, including the
oil and gas industry, where approval by the Prime Minister is needed.
55
The FOE is restricted to fields that the government would not deem vital to
national interests since the FOE would have ownership of all resources and
is allowed to repatriate its profits. The entity has a duration of twenty-five
to fifty years, not exceeding seventy.'56
A Build-Operate-Transfer ("BOT") arrangement is a contract between
the government and a private investor, where the foreign investor builds an
industrial project and operates it for a set duration then transfers it to the
government.' 7 The time allotment is of sufficient duration to pay for the
cost of construction and make a reasonable profit.'58 At expiration, the
project is transferred to the government without further compensation to the
foreign investor. 5 9 A BOT can be entered into by either a joint venture or a
foreign-owned entity. If an FOE participates in a BOT then it does not have
a domestic partner to connect it to the government. However, the govern-
ment supports a BOT more than an FOE in view of the fact that they will
assume the enterprise at the end of its term.' 60 Although the government is
unwilling to give up perpetual rights to production of its natural resources,
the government is willing to surrender rights of ownership for the fifty to
ISO Bus. VIETNAM, supra note32; Law on Foreign Investment 1996, supra note 138, arts.
13-14.
151 George T. Ellinidis, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing and Newly Liberalized
Nations, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 299,306 (1995).
152 Wunker, supra note 58, at 367.
153 Id.; DODSWORTH, supra note 35, at 16.
154 Genovese, supra note 71, at 8.
155 Id. at 9; DODSWORTH, supra note 35, at 16.
156 Wunker, supra note 58, at 367.
15 7 Id. at 367-68.
158 Chang, supra note 142, at 35.
159 Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to Developing Countries Via Private
Sector Project Financing, 8 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 91, 93 (1995).
16°Id_ at 103.
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seventy year duration if an absence of production would otherwise be a
threat to national sovereignty.
1 61
D. Investment Incentives
Enticing foreign investors is a difficult challenge for Vietnam where
substantial financial risk is placed on the foreign investor and their control
over operations is not absolute. The Government has attempted to over-
come this challenge by offering incentives that reduce the financial risk to
the investor. Such incentives do not require the Government to shoulder
any additional financial burden nor relinquish any control. Vietnam offers
these incentives in the FIL and attaches specific incentives to specific in-
dustries and investment forms. The investor can receive financial reduc-
tions in the cost of developing an enterprise. Traditionally, incentives have
taken the form of preferential tax treatment, exemption or reduction of tariff
rates, guarantees of currency convertibility and the use of property and
other government assets. 162 The cost of importing materials and of building
the infrastructure are also reduced by the incentives.
The government has been able to dictate which industries will receive
FDI and who can invest in those designated industries based on the incen-
tives it offers. The rationale for such selectivity is that the government can
acquire the most sophisticated foreign technology and training. Though in-
centives reduce current revenue to the government, they encourage greater
revenues in the future. The government also reserves the right to repeal the
incentive once it has outlived its usefulness or conflicts with a government
objective. Because incentives are often predicated on government involve-
ment in the management of the enterprise, this can present problems for fi-
nancing. Credit institutions traditionally hold that the lack of managerial
expertise is likely to result in poor management of its assets and failure of
the project. 163 However, the foreign partner will benefit from the incentives
extended to itself or to the domestic partner and benefit from the relation-
ship the domestic partner has with the government and the local popula-
tion.' 64
E. Land Use Right
An important incentive related to the oil and gas industry is the right to
use the land where the reserves are located. 16' A land use right is an interest
161 Christopher J. Sozzi, Project Finance and Facilitating Telecommunications Infra-
structure Development in Newly-Industrializing Countries, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 435, 445-46 (1996).
162 Global Private Power, supra note 143, at 4-5.
163 Charles E. Harrell et al., Securitization of Oil, Gas and Other Natural Resource As-
sets: Emerging Financing Techniques, 52 Bus. LAW. 885, 901 (1997).
16 id.
165 Land also includes water and sea surfaces. Law on Land, supra note 127, art. 71.
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in land that falls short of full ownership. 166 The land use right is not an ab-
solute grant of land because there are restrictions to its transferability. Land
unlike other natural resources is subject to the socialist principle of state
ownership and indivisibility. 167 The socialist policies of the government re-
quire users of land to protect, replenish, rationally exploit and economically
use land for the benefit of the state. 68 The land use right is given for a spe-
cific purpose, which coincides with this state goal. 169 The right is given for
a set duration, generally twenty-five to fifty years, with a possibility of ex-
tension to seventy years if the continuation of the enterprise is consistent
with the FIL and state policies.' 70 The land use right also conveys owner-
ship of the improvements on the land to the foreign investor.17' However,
the process of reversion is untested because none of the rights have expired
and it is unclear if this ownership ends with the expiration of the right. The
question remains whether the improvements will be sold to the government
or whether they are transferred automatically.
72
To resolve this problem for foreign investors, the government of Viet-
nam grants land use rights to a project absolving the foreign investor from
paying rent or taxes on the use of the land. The grant is given by certificate
after the project has been assessed as coinciding with government objec-
tives. This grant, however, was initially only available to joint ventures be-
cause the land could not be transferred to a foreign party. Land had to be
vested in a state agency which in the case of the oil and gas industry was
the Petrovietnam. The land use right granted to Petrovietnam was still a fi-
nancial incentive to foreign investors because they would have been unable
to have access to the land without the grant.
Land once vested in the state agency is a valuable asset to be contrib-
uted by the Vietnamese party to a joint venture. This places a great deal of
emphasis on the valuation of the land. Land is valued by the People's
Committees. Land is not valued until a project has received license ap-
proval from the national government. These two factors often lead to sus-
pect valuation practices. The local People's Committees derive income off
the taxes assessed on the land they manage, creating an incentive to over-
value the land. Overvaluation also occurs when land is valued after license
approval. The domestic entity and the foreign investor each agree to pro-
vide a certain amount of capital to the project prior to approval. If the land
166 Gillespie, supra note 76, at 339. The Land Law also encompasses rights to sea sur-
faces. Id.
167 Thuyet, supra note 45, at 549.




172 Id. at 340, 352.
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is valued after these amounts are set, there is an incentive to overvalue the
land so that the hard currency a domestic entity must contribute is reduced.
The financing of an oil or gas project is often dependent on being able
to pledge land as collateral on a loan. Domestic loans are given on the
value of the land use right because the domestic currency is not readily
convertible.' 74 Only Vietnamese partners had the right to pledge the land
because they were the only party allowed to hold title. The valuation of the
land is very important to the allocation of profits among partners, because
the right is vested with the Vietnamese party and constitutes part of the
Vietnamese party's percentage of the capital to the project and subsequent
entitlement to profits. Because the government is solely responsible for
valuing the land, the land is often overvalued to give the appearance that the
Vietnamese party is assuming a greater portion of the financial burden of
the project.
For this reason foreign investors evaluate land as an investment incen-
tive according to certain factors. These factors are closely related to the
cost and the feasibility of financing. They include: 1) the rental fees associ-
ated with the land (or any waiver of the fees); 2) on whom the obligation to
pay the rental fees rests; 3) who holds title to the land; and 4) the transfer-
ability of the land including the ability to pledge the land as collateral to a
bank. Because of the deferment of costs associated with landuse, land was
considered a cost incentive to foreign investors to invest which altered the
risk versus control balance.
IV. VIETNAM'S LEGAL STRUCTURE: CHANGES IN THE LAND LAW
A. The Land Law
The original Land Law of December 1987 stated (1) that land belongs
to the people but is administered by the state; (2) that the state uniformly
administers land; (3) that the state promotes the economical use of land; (4)
that the state protects agricultural land; and (5) that the state encourages
land users to invest labor and capital in land for improvement and regenera-
tion. 17' This statement demonstrates the basic socialist philosophy behind
retaining control over state resources. There were also provisions that pre-
vented transferring land to a private party. The Land Law, read in conjunc-
tion with the FIL, prohibited investors from entering the market other than
173 It appears that the government will only allow the land to be pledge to a Vietnamese
bank, which are all state run. This is due in part to the fact that the financing is non-
recourse. The land is not transferred to the bank on default. Rather, the land reverts back to
the State which pays damages to the bank that was holding the loan. Decree No. I 8/CP, su-
pra note 119, at art. 9.
174 Gillespie, supra note 76, at 353.
175 Hong-Anh Tran, An Assessment of the Vietnamese Land Law and Regulation, 13
WISC. INT'L LAw J. 585, 589-90 (1995).
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under a joint venture where the land was vested in the state agency. 76 For-
eigners could not hold title to land directly, thus precluding the possibility
of a foreign investor entering the market as 100% foreign-owned entity.'
The Land Law under went changes in 1993 making it easier for foreign
investors to get land use rights. Land transfer restrictions were lifted to al-
low other market entry forms to acquire land use rights.'7 8 Though the
Land Law itself is ambiguous as to who is entitled to these expanded
rights, 179 corresponding changes to the FIL outline which investment forms
most benefit from the new land policies.80
According to the 1993 Land Law, projects that were essential to na-
tional security would be eligible for consideration by the government for
land use rights.' 8' Included within national security concerns were projects
for "fields of industry, science and technology... combined with economic
purposes.' ' 2 The government as a means of protecting its control over the
land also stipulated that the State reserved the right "for the purpose of na-
tional defence [sic], security, national or public interest, [to] recover posses-
sion of the land""' and granted the same right to the People's Committees
in the event of an emergency. 18 4 The land amendments recognized that for-
eign investors would be an integral part of industrial project development
requiring land use rights. As a result, the government would consider their
needs on a case by case basis. 85 These decisions were to be made in light
of the more specific provisions of the FIL.1
8 6
Under the Amended 1993 FIL, joint ventures continue to be granted
land use rights. 87 The FIL, however, conspicuously fails to discuss land
procurement under the 100% foreign owned entity.188 The 1993 Amend-
ments permitted, for the first time, development projects under the BOT
form.'89 BOT's are allowed to mortgage a land use right and the govern-
176 Regulation on Foreign Investment, supra note 119, art. 7, 26.
177 Tran, supra note 175, at 591. BOTs were not a legal form under the FIL at this time.
Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 12, art. 3-7.
178 See generally Law on Land, supra note 127.
179 d .at art. 80.
180 Regulation on Foreign Investment, supra note 119, art. 56. Apr. 16, 1993; Regulations
on B-O-T Contracts, art. 6, Nov. 23, 1993; Decree No. 1417-TC/TCDN, Regulation on the
Rent Prices for Land, Dec. 28, 1994.
181 Law on Land, supra note 127, art. 65.
182 id.
'
83 Id. art. 27.84 Id. art. 28.
's Id. art. 80.
116ld. art. 81 & 83.
187 Regulations on Foreign Investment, supra note 19, art. 26.
11 Id. Ch. IV.
1'9 Id. art. 56. The FIL refers to additional legislation which goes into greater detail on the
terms and rights of a BOT. Id.
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ment is willing to exempt the land rent associated with the mortgage.' 90
The BOT contract with the government can be entered into by both a joint
venture and a 100% foreign-owned entity.19' In the case of the joint ven-
ture, the ability to mortgage and the waiver of rent appears to be the same
incentive offered under a non-BOT joint venture. In contrast, the BOT
contract used by a 100% foreign owned entity seems to be the first attempt
by the government to allow a foreign investor to hold title to land directly at
least for the duration of the BOT contract.' 92 But, the ability of the FOE to
secure the land is still based on government approval. 93 The government
states that it would prefer an active role in certain industries:
[P]rojects which are of economic importance and shall provide guid-
ance for the foreign investor to state in the application for investment that it
will consent to a Vietnamese enterprise, on the basis of agreement, pur-
chasing a share of the capital of the enterprise so as to have the result of
converting it into a joint venture enterprise.
The government essentially requires applicants for 100% foreign-
owned enterprise to agree to a conversion provision in their application if
the Government deems the project to be crucial to the economy, likely in-
cluding the oil and gas industry.' 95 Conversion of a 100% FOE to a joint
venture essentially means that any land allocated to the project will vest in
the domestic Vietnamese party.' 96 It appears that in all cases the govern-
ment is not willing to give title to land, for any duration, to a foreign inves-
tor.
The Land Law was amended in February 13, 1995, requiring domestic
Vietnamese parties to pay rent on the land that was previously granted
without fees.' 97 In addition, law stipulated domestic entities would now:
(1) be issued a land use certificate; (2) have the right to pledge a land lease
for a loan; and (3) have priority in continuing the investment project upon
expiration of the land lease. 9' Forcing domestic entities to lease land abol-
ished land use grants under joint venture agreements. Instead of depending
on a Vietnamese party to hold title to the land, land could be transferred di-
rectly to the foreign investor under a BOT. Textually, the law appears to
remove an incentive to enter the Vietnamese market as a joint venture by
placing a greater financial burden and risk on the foreign investor. How-
'90 Decree No. 87/CP, Regulation of B-O-T Contracts, art. 6, Nov. 23, 1993 [hereinafter
Decree No. 87/CP].
191 Regulations on Foreign Investment, supra note 119, art. 55.
192 Decree No. 87/CP, supra note 191, art. 6-7.
193 id.
194 Regulation on Foreign Investment, supra note 119, art. 47.
195 Id.
'
96 Id. art. 26.
'97 Decree No. 18/CP, supra note 119, art. 5.
.
98 Id. arts. 5 & 9.
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ever, the law liberalizes oil and gas project development because the foreign
investor has an alternative form to operate under, the BOT. Investors have
a greater choice in investment forms and potentially more control over op-
erations.
In an extremely controversial move, the Vietnamese Government's re-
scission of land grants to domestic entities was applied retroactively.' 99 The
Decree abolished current grants to land use rights to domestic entities and
converted them to leases.2'0 Now overvaluation could serve to discourage
investors if the resulting rental fees are excessive. Pursuant to the Decree,
the Prime Minister sets the rental rates reducing the trend of overvalua-
tion.20 1 The leases are subsequently worth less than the previous land use
rights.0 2 Credit institutions have been forced to call outstanding loans
prematurely, because devaluation of the land results in insufficient collat-
eral on the loan.203 Under current terms, projects get less financing because
the land use rights are not sufficient to secure a loan.204 Although land is
transferable for a certain duration to a private party, under a lease the gov-
ernment retains the right to retake the land for emergency reasons.20 1 It is
suspected that such an emergency will occur if there is the possibility of a
bank repossessing Vietnamese land after default on a loan. The end result
is that corporations are being forced to re-calibrate the cost benefit analysis
of investing in Vietnam under one investment vehicle or another. Some in-
vestors claim that these changes are an indication that Vietnam is not com-
mitted to a free market economy. However, these changes, though
retracting an incentive, have had the effect of encouraging investors to use
another investment form that would give them greater management control
at an equivalent or reduced level of financial risk.
B. Choosing the Best Investment Vehicle
Without the incentive of a land use right, U.S. investors should seek an
investment vehicle that gives them greater control over management opera-
tions. The revised Land Law eliminates land incentives from the cost bene-
fit analysis of foreign investors. This elimination creates parity among the
investment forms as far as mitigating the cost of acquiring the land. If the
foreign investor leases the land instead of having a Vietnamese party con-
tribute it, then the internal management risk is removed.
199 Id. art. 5.
200 Thuyet, supra note 45, at 551.
201 Nguyen, supra note 129.
202 Thuyet, supra note 45, at 551.
203 Id.
204 Tran, supra note 175, at 596.
205 Law on Land, supra note 127, art. 27-28.
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The level of control associated with each investment form can be
evaluated according to a risk v. control analysis. Under a BCC, the produc-
tion tasks are allocated ahead of time and each party has management con-
trol over their task. The profits are stipulated in the contract and are not
based on a pro-rata percentage of the capital invested by each party. Al-
though management of one party's task is absolute once the contract is
formed, extensive negotiations are required to get to this point. Under the
theory that contract negotiations are costly and increase with the number of
provisions that have to be worked out, the cost of establishing a BCC is ex-
cessive. BCCs are also inflexible once negotiated. Confining actions by
the parties to those contracted for prior to actually commencing a project
limits the capability to respond to problems that do not have a solution un-
der contract. Management of only specific tasks does not outweigh the cost
of contracting nor the financial risk associated with a BCC. The changes in
the Land Law do little to make this form more feasible for an oil and gas
project because the domestic party to the contract is responsible for paying
the cost of rent and this value is calculated into its contribution to the con-
tract. °6
The rescission of land use grants decreases a foreign investor's incen-
tive to use the joint venture. The financial risk associated with entering a
joint venture is equivalent to any other form now that joint ventures are no
longer exempted from rental fees. However the managerial risks associated
with this form persist. Joint ventures require a domestic partner which is
the Petrovietnam. One of the requirements of operation under this form is
that the general director of the board be Vietnamese.20 7 The board as a
whole must vote unanimously on all decisions,20 8 thus greatly restricting
management control by the foreign investor.0 9 It is likely that all decisions
that do not conform to state objectives will be overruled by the general di-
rector. This presents a latent financial risk because banks are unwilling to
fund projects with inexperienced managers.
A foreign investor in a FOE has the greatest management control and
the greatest return on capital. No government party is required to have any
position in the corporation's management. Financial risk is mitigated be-
cause the FOE has control over all management aspects of the enterprise.
2
,0
Despite the superior management expertise attributed to the FOE, it lacks
the relationship to the government and population inherent in a joint ven-
ture.2 1 It is unlikely that this investment form would be approved by the
206 Decree No. 1417-TC/TCDN, Regulation on the Rent Prices for Land, art. 1, Dec. 28,
1994.
207 Law on Foreign Investment 1996, supra note 138, art. 12.
2
.Id. art. 13-14.
209 Thuyet, supra note 45, at 576.
210 Genovese, supra note 71, at 10.
211 Ellinidis, supra note 151, at 302-04.
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government. The oil and gas industry is too important to Vietnam's econ-
omy for the government not to plan its development.
A BOT contract between a 100% foreign-owned entity and the gov-
ernment is the best form for U.S. investors in the oil and gas industry. All
the managerial benefits of the FOE inure to the foreign investor under the
BOT as they would without the BOT contract. The investor has complete
control over all the management decisions. The BOT as a result is a more
efficient enterprise than one involving direct government control.212 The
private investors have a strong profit motive to operate as efficiently as pos-
sible in development and production 2 3 due to the limited duration of the
project and the high degree of financial risk.
The expert management and operational capabilities of the BOT are a
demonstration to the government of how the enterprise should be managed
when it assumes the project.21 4 Although the investor must shoulder all the
financial burden, the government is accommodating to the investor offering
exemptions to fees and taxes. The 1996 revised FIL now provides land rent
free to projects under the BOT, showing government favor of the BOT form
over the joint venture.21 5 Because the BOT operates for a limited duration
and the project reverts to the government after the term expires, it is in the
government's best interest to cooperate with corporations doing business
under this form.216 Part of this cooperation is limiting government inter-
vention. The Prime Minister is solely responsible for oversight of these
agreements. 217 The government also allows a 100% foreign-owned entity to
exist under a BOT in the oil and gas industry where it could not otherwise
exist. This development can be attributed to the diplomacy of the World
Bank in convincing the government to allow a 100% foreign owned BOT in
connection with a power plant project in 1996.218 This opened the door for
other energy projects to use the same form. This kind of control and gov-
ernment support arguably mitigates financial and managerial risk relative to
the other investment forms. Banks are more willing to provide collateral; it
is in the best interest of the government to ensure the project succeeds; and
the foreign investor is not required to share profits or control with another
partner.
212 David A. Levy, BOT and Public Procurement: .4 Conceptual Framework, 7 IND.
INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 95, 103-04 (1996).2 13 id.
214 id.
215 Law on Foreign Investment 1996, supra note 138, art. 46.
2 16 id.
217 Decree No. 87/CP, supra note 190, art. 3.
218 Vietnam: Foreign Investors Not Convinced, Bus. VIETNAM, Aug. 1, 1996, at 2.
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V. CONCLUSION
U.S. corporations seeking to enter Vietnam's oil and gas industry
should do so through a 100% FOE under a BOT contract. In the past, U.S.
corporations would enter the Vietnamese market because of investment in-
centives that reduced the costs of development. This was often accom-
plished by entering into a joint venture with Vietnamese parties. However,
operating with a Vietnamese partner meant relinquishing control over man-
agement decisions to a board consisting, in part, of government officials
and limiting profits to the percentage of the original capital invested. This
outcome limited the extent to which corporations could exploit Vietnam's
liberal foreign investment laws because all managerial decisions needed to
coincide with government market growth objectives. Limited control also
reduced the large short-term profits expected in comparison to the market
activities of other Asian nations. The FIL has been evolving since Vietnam
first sought to open its markets to private investment in 1987. The Land
Law is an example of a law that has undergone several changes which at
first provided large incentives for investment and later rescinded them. As
a result, the foreign investor is becoming more focused on retaining control
rather than on obtaining incentives. U.S. corporations can assume more
control over their operations while keeping costs equivalent to those under a
more restrictive form. Increased management control will lead to greater
profits provided these businesses are prepared to make long-term invest-
ments. The BOT contract allows a foreign investor to develop a project for
an extended duration, recoup its investment, make a profit, and retain all
management control. Therefore, the mode of business operation best suited
for U.S. investors is the BOT.
